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OR MUCH (and perhaps most) of human history, 
demographic patterns were fairly stable: the human 
population grew slowly, and age structures, birth 
rates, and death rates changed very little. The slow 
long-run  growth  in  population  was  interrupted  periodi-
cally by epidemics and pandemics that could sharply reduce 
population numbers, but these events had little bearing on 
long-term trends.
Over the past 140 years, however, this picture has given way 
to the biggest demographic upheaval in history, an upheaval 
that is still running its course. Since 1870 death rates and 
birth rates have been declining in developed countries. This 
long-term trend toward lower fertility was interrupted by a 
sharp, post–World War II rise in fertility, which was followed 
by an equally sharp fall (a “bust”), defining the “baby boom.” 
The aging of this generation and continued declines in fertil-
ity are shifting the population balance in developed countries 
from young to old. In the developing world, reductions in 
mortality resulting from improved nutrition, public health 
infrastructure, and medical care were followed by reductions 
in  birth  rates.  Once  they  began,  these  declines  proceeded 
much more rapidly than they did in the developed countries. 
The fact that death rates decline before birth rates has led to 
a population explosion in developing countries over the past 
50 years.
Even if the underlying causes of rapid population growth 
were  to  suddenly  disappear,  humanity  would  continue  to 
experience  demographic  change  for  some  time  to  come. 
Rapid increases in the global population over the past few 
decades have resulted in large numbers of people of child-
bearing age (whose children form an “echo” generation). This 
creates “population momentum,” where the populations of 
most countries, even those with falling birth rates, will grow 
for many years, particularly in developing countries.
These changes have huge implications for the pace of eco-
nomic development. Economic analysis has tended to focus on 
the issue of population numbers and growth rates as factors that 
can put pressure on scarce resources, dilute the capital-labor 
ratio, or lead to economies of scale. However, demographic 
change  has  important  additional  dimensions.  Increasing 
average life expectancy can change life-cycle behavior affect-
ing education, retirement, and savings decisions—potentially 
boosting the financial capital on which investors draw and 
the human capital that strengthens economies. Demographic change  also 
affects  population 
age structure, altering the 
ratio of workers to dependents. 
This issue of F&D looks at many facets 
of the impact of demographic change on the global economy 
and  examines  the  policy  adjustments  needed  in  both  the 
developed and the developing world.
sharp rise in global population
The global population, which stood at just over 2.5 billion 
in 1950, has risen to 6.5 billion today, with 76 million new 
inhabitants added each year (representing the difference, in 
2005, for example, between 134 million births and 58 million 
deaths).  Although  this  growth  is  slowing,  middle-ground 
projections suggest the world will have 9.1 billion inhabitants 
by 2050 (see “Global Demographic Trends” on page 14).
These past and projected additions to world population 
have  been,  and  will  increasingly  be,  distributed  unevenly 
across  the  world.  Today,  95  percent  of  population  growth 
occurs  in  developing  countries.  The  populations  of  the 
world’s 50 least developed countries are expected to more 
than double by the middle of this century, with several poor 
countries tripling their populations over the period. By con-
trast, the population of the developed world is expected to 
remain  steady  at  about  1.2  billion,  with  declines  in  some 
wealthy countries.
The disparity in population growth between developed and 
developing countries reflects the considerable heterogeneity 
in birth, death, and migration processes, both over time and 
across national populations, races, and ethnic groups. The 
disparity has also coincided with changes in the age composi-
tion of populations. An overview of these factors illuminates 
the mechanisms of population growth and change around 
the world.
Total fertility rate. The total world fertility rate, that is, the 
number of children born per woman, fell from about 5 in 
1950 to a little over 2.5 in 2006 (see Chart 1). This number is 
projected to fall to about 2 by 2050. This decrease is attribut-
able largely to changes in fertility in the developing world and 
can be ascribed to a number of factors, including declines in 
infant mortality rates, greater levels of female education and 
increased labor market opportunities, and the provision of 
family-planning services. 
Infant and child mortality decline. The developing world 
has seen significant reductions in infant and child mortality 
over the past 50 years. These gains are primarily the result 
of  improved  nutrition,  public  health  interventions  related 
to water and sanitation, and medical advances, such as the 
use of vaccines and antibiotics. Infant mortality (death prior 
to age 1) in developing countries has dropped from 180 to 
about 57 deaths per 1,000 live births. It is projected to decline 
to fewer than 30 by 2050. By contrast, developed countries 
have seen infant mortality decline from 59 deaths per 1,000 
live births to 7 since 1950, and this is projected to decline fur-
ther still, to 4 by 2050. Child mortality (death prior to age 5) 
has also fallen in both developed and developing countries.
Life expectancy and longevity. For the world as a whole, life 
expectancy increased from 47 years in 1950–55 to 65 years 
in 2000–05. It is projected to rise to 75 years by the middle 
of  this  century,  with  considerable  disparities  between  the 
wealthy industrial countries, at 82 years, and the less devel-
oped countries, at 74 years (see Chart 2). (Two major excep-
tions to the upward trend are sub-Saharan Africa, where the 
AIDS epidemic has drastically lowered life expectancy, and 
some of the countries of the former Soviet Union, where eco-
nomic dislocations have led to significant health problems.) 
As a result of the global decline in fertility, and because peo-
ple are living longer, the proportion of the elderly in the total 
population is rising sharply. The number of people over the age 
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24, is expected to reach 1 billion (overtaking the 15–24 age 
group) by 2020 and almost 2 billion by 2050. The proportion 
of individuals aged 80 or over is projected to rise from 1 per-
cent to 4 percent of the global population by 2050.
Age  distribution:  working-age  population.  Baby  booms 
have altered the demographic landscape in many countries. 
As the experiences of several regions during the past century 
show, an initial fall in mortality rates creates a boom genera-
tion in which high survival rates lead to more people at young 
ages than in earlier generations. Fertility rates fall over time, as 
parents realize they do not need to give birth to  as many chil-
dren to reach their desired family size, or as desired family size 
contracts for other reasons. When fertility falls and the baby 
boom stops, the age structure of the population then shows a 
“bulge” or baby-boom age cohort created by the nonsynchro-
nous falls in mortality and fertility. As this generation moves 
through the population age structure, it constitutes a share of 
the population larger than the cohorts that precede or follow. 
This creates particular challenges and opportunities for coun-
tries, such as a large youth cohort to be educated, followed by 
an unusually large working-age (approximately ages 15–64) 
population, with the prospect of a “demographic dividend,” 
and  characterized  eventually  by  a  large  elderly  population, 
which may burden the health and pension systems (see Chart 3 
and “What Is the Demographic Dividend?” on page 16).
Migration.  Migration  also  alters  population  patterns. 
Globally, 191 million people live in countries other than the 
one in which they were born. On average during the next 45 
years, the United Nations projects that over 2.2 million indi-
viduals will migrate annually from developing to developed 
countries. It also projects that the United States will receive 
by far the largest number of immigrants (1.1 million a year), 
and China, Mexico, India, the Philippines, and Indonesia will 
be the main sources of emigrants (see “Global Migration” on 
page 23).
Urbanization.  In  both  developed  and  developing  coun-
tries, there has been huge movement from rural to urban 
areas since 1950. Less developed regions, in aggregate, have 
seen their population shift from 18 percent to 44 percent 
urban, while the corresponding figures for developed coun-
tries are 52 percent to 75 percent. A new UN report says that 
in 2007 the worldwide balance will tip and more than half of 
all people will be living in urban areas. This shift—and the 
concomitant urbanization of areas that were formerly peri-
urban or rural—is consistent with the shift in most countries 
away from agriculturally based economies.
The existence and growth of megacities (that is, those with 
10 million or more residents) is a late-20th-century phenom-
enon that has brought with it special problems. There were 
20 such cities in 2003, 15 in developing countries. Tokyo is 
by far the largest, with 35 million people, followed by (in 
descending order) Mexico City, New York, São Paulo, and 
Mumbai (all with 17 to 19 million). Cities in general allow 
for economies of scale—and, most often, for a salutary mix of 
activities, resources, and people—that make them centers of 
economic growth and activity and account, in some measure, 
for  their  attractiveness. As  continued  movement  to  urban 
areas leads to megacities, however, these economies of scale 
and of agglomeration seem to be countered, to some extent, 
by problems that arise in transportation, housing, air pollu-
tion, and waste management. In some instances, socioeco-
nomic disparities are particularly exacerbated in megacities.
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Chart 1
Smaller families
Fertility rates are tending to converge at lower levels after 
earlier sharp declines.
(total fertility rate; children per woman)
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Chart 2
Living longer
Life expectancy is continuing to rise, but there are big 
differences between rates in well-off and poorer countries.
(life expectancy in years)
“A new UN report says that  
in 2007 the worldwide balance will 
tip and more than half of all people 
will be living in urban areas.”What is the impact on economies?
The economic consequences of population growth have long 
been the subject of debate. Early views on the topic, pioneered 
by Thomas Malthus, held that population growth would lead 
to the exhaustion of resources. In the 1960s, it was proposed 
that population growth aided economic development by spur-
ring technological and institutional innovation and increasing 
the supply of human ingenuity. Toward the end of the 1960s, a 
neo-Malthusian view, focusing again on the dangers of popu-
lation growth, became popular. Population control policies in 
China and India, while differing greatly from each other, can 
be seen in this light. Population neutralism, a middle-ground 
view, based on empirical analysis of the link between popu-
lation growth and economic performance, has held sway for 
the past two decades. According to this view, the net impact of 
population growth on economic growth is negligible.
Population  neutralism  is  only  recently  giving  way  to  a 
more fine-grained view of the effects of population dynamics 
in which demographic change does contribute to or detract 
from economic development. To make their case, economists 
and demographers point to both the “arithmetic accounting” 
effects of age structure change and the effects of behavioral 
change caused by longer life spans (see box, page 12).
Arithmetic accounting effects. These effects assume con-
stant  behavior  within  age  and  sex  groups,  but  allow  for 
changes in the relative size of those groups to influence over-
all  outcomes.  For  example,  holding  age-  and  sex-specific 
labor  force  participation  rates  constant,  a  change  in  age 
structure affects total labor supply.
As a country’s baby-boom generation gets older, for a time 
it constitutes a large cohort of working-age individuals and, 
later, a large cohort of elderly people. The span of years rep-
resented  by  the  boom  generation  (which  determines  how 
quickly this cohort moves through the age structure) and the 
size of the population bulge vary greatly from one country 
to another. In all circumstances, there are reasons to think 
that this very dynamic age structure will have economic con-
sequences.  A  historically  high  proportion  of  working-age 
individuals in a population means that, potentially, there are 
more  workers  per  dependent  than  previously.  Production 
can therefore increase relative to consumption, and GDP per 
capita can receive a boost.
Life-cycle patterns in savings also come into play as a pop-
ulation’s age structure changes. People save more during their 
working-age years, and if the working-age cohort is much 
larger than other age groups, savings per capita will increase.
Behavioral effects. Declining rates of adult mortality and 
the movement of large cohorts through the global population 
pyramid will lead to a massive expansion in the proportion 
of elderly in the world population (see the projections for 
2050 in Chart 4). Some simple economic projections show 
catastrophic effects of this aging. But such projections tend 
to be based on an “accounting” approach, which assumes that 
age-specific  behavior  remains  unchanged  and  ignores  the 
potentially significant effects of behavior change.
The aging of the baby-boom generation potentially pro-
motes labor shortages, creating upward pressure on wages 
and downward pressure on the real incomes of retirees. In 
response,  people  may  adjust  their  behavior,  resulting  in 
increased labor force participation, the immigration of work-
ers  from  developing  countries,  and  longer  working  lives. 
Child mortality declines can also have behavioral effects, par-
ticularly for women, who tend to be the primary caregivers 
for children. When the reduced fertility effect of a decrease 
in child mortality is in place, more women participate in the 
workforce, further boosting the labor supply.
the missing link
Demographic effects are a key missing link in many macro-
economic analyses that aim to explain cross-country differ-
ences  in  economic  growth  and  poverty  reduction.  Several 
empirical studies show the importance of demographics in 
explaining economic development.
East Asia’s baby boom. East Asia’s remarkable economic 
growth in the past half century coincided closely with demo-
graphic change in the region. As infant mortality fell from 
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Chart 3
Tracking the bulge
Developing countries are nearing the peak of their opportunity 
to benefit from a high ratio of workers to dependents.
(ratio of working-age to non-working-age population)













The number of people living past 80 is projected to rise sharply, 
but labor shortages could drive up living costs for retirees.
(world population, aged 80+; millions)
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fell from six to two children per woman. The lag between falls 
in mortality and fertility created a baby-boom generation: 
between 1965 and 1990, the region’s working-age population 
grew nearly four times faster than the dependent population. 
Several studies have estimated that this demographic shift 
was responsible for one-third of East Asia’s economic growth 
during the period (a welcome demographic dividend).
Labor supply and the Celtic Tiger. From 1960 to 1990, the 
growth rate of income per capita in Ireland was approximately 
3.5 percent a year. In the 1990s, it jumped to 5.8 percent, well 
in  excess  of  any  other  European  economy.  Demographic 
change contributed to the country’s economic surge. In the 
decade following the legalization of contraceptives in 1979, 
Ireland saw a sharp fall in the crude birth rate. This led to 
decreasing youth dependency and a rise in the working-age 
share of the total population. By the mid-1990s, the depen-
dency burden in Ireland had dropped to a level below that in 
the United Kingdom.
Two  additional  demography-based  factors  also  helped 
fuel economic growth by increasing labor supply per capita. 
First,  while  male  labor  force  participation  rates  remained 
fairly static, the period 1980–2000 saw a substantial increase 
in female labor force participation rates, particularly among 
those aged between 25 and 40. Second, Ireland historically had 
high emigration levels among young adults (about 1 percent 
of the population a year) because its economy was unable to 
absorb the large number of young workers created by its high 
fertility rate. The loss of these young workers exacerbated the 
problem of the high youth dependency rate. The decline in 
youth cohort sizes and rapid economic growth of the 1990s 
led to a reversal of this flow, resulting in net in-migration of 
workers, made up partly of return migrants and also, for the 
first time, substantial numbers of foreign immigrants.
Continued high fertility in sub-Saharan Africa. Demographic 
change of a very different type can account for slow economic 
development. Much of sub-Saharan Africa remains stalled at 
the first stage of a demographic transition. Fertility rates actu-
ally increased a bit from the 1950s through the 1970s and only 
recently have begun a slow fall. As swollen youth cohorts have 
entered the labor force, an inadequate policy and economic envi-
ronment in most countries has prevented many young people 
from being able to engage in productive employment. The exis-
tence of large dependent populations (in this case, of children) 
has kept the proportion of working-age people low, making it 
more difficult for these economies to rise out of poverty.
looking to the future
Based on the indicators that are available, we can make a few 
important points:
•  All  signs  point  to  continued  but  slowing  population 
growth. This growth will result in the addition of roughly 
2.5 billion people to the world population, before it stabilizes 
around 2050 at about 9 billion. Managing this increase will 
be an enormous challenge, and the economic consequences 
of failing to do so could be severe.
•  The  world’s  population  is  aging  rapidly.  The  United 
Nations  predicts  that  31  percent  of  China’s  population  in 
2050—432 million people—will be age 60 or older. The cor-
responding figures for India are 21 percent and 330 million. 
No longer can aging be thought of as just a developed-world 
phenomenon.
•  International migration will continue, but the extent is 
unclear. The pressures that encourage people to migrate—
above all, the lure of greater economic well-being in the devel-
oped countries—will undoubtedly persist, but the strength 
of countervailing policy restrictions that could substantially 
stanch the flow of migrants is impossible to predict.
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How much can the human life span be stretched?
In most of the world, children born today can expect to live for 
many decades longer than their ancestors born in the 19th or 
early 20th centuries. In Japan, life expectancy at birth is now 
82 years, and other regions have also made great progress as 
medical and public health advances, improved nutrition, and 
behavioral changes encouraged by improved education have 
combined to reduce the risk of death at all ages. But how far 
can these increases in longevity go?
Continuing  increases  in  life  expectancy  in  low-mortality 
populations have led some demographers to forecast further 
gains. Kenneth Manton, Eric Stallard, and H. Dennis Tolley, 
for example, estimate that populations with extremely healthy 
lifestyles—that is, with an absence or near-absence of risk fac-
tors such as infectious disease, smoking, alcohol abuse, and 
obesity, and the presence of health-promoting behaviors such 
as a healthy diet and exercise—could achieve a life expectancy 
of between 95 and 100 years.
But others have reached different conclusions. Nan Li and 
Ronald Lee estimate that life expectancy in the United States 
will rise from a 1996 figure of 76.3 to 84.9 by 2050, with that in 
Japan rising from 80.5 to 88.1. S. Jay Olshansky, Bruce Carnes, 
and Aline Desesquelles predicted in 1990 that life expectancy 
at birth would not surpass 85 years, even in low-mortality set-
tings. Death rates, they argued, would not fall sufficiently for 
life expectancy to rise rapidly, and earlier increases were driven 
largely by dramatic reductions in infant and child mortality, 
which could not recur (Samuel Preston, on the other hand, 
observes that 60 percent of the life expectancy increase in the 
United States since 1950 is due to mortality declines in people 
over the age of 50). Perhaps more important, they saw no rea-
son why the future should necessarily mirror the past—new 
threats to health such as influenza pandemics, antibiotic resis-
tance, and obesity could reverse gains made in recent decades; 
technological improvements could stall and the drugs needed 
to counter the diseases of aging might not be found; and envi-
ronmental disasters, economic collapse, or war could derail 
health systems at the same time that they weaken individuals’ 
ability to protect their own health.•  Urbanization will continue, but the pace is also hard 
to predict. Greater economic opportunities in the cities will 
surely continue to attract migrants from rural areas, but envi-
ronmental and social problems may stymie growth.
getting the focus right
Rapid and significant demographic change places new demands 
on national and international policymaking. Transitions from 
high mortality and fertility to low mortality and fertility can be 
beneficial to economies as large baby-boom cohorts enter the 
workforce and save for retirement. Rising longevity also tends 
to increase the incentives to save for old age.
The ability of countries to realize the potential benefits of 
the demographic transition and to mitigate the negative effects 
of aging depends crucially on the policy and institutional envi-
ronment. Focusing on the following areas is likely to be key:
Health and nutrition. Although it has long been known 
that increased income leads to improved health, recent evi-
dence indicates that good health may also be an important 
factor in economic development. Good nutrition in children 
is essential for brain development 
and for allowing them to become 
productive  members  of  society. 
Health  improvements—especially 
among  infants  and  children—
often  lead  to  declines  in  fertility, 
above and beyond the heightened 
quality of life they imply. Focusing 
on the diseases of childhood can 
therefore  increase  the  likelihood 
of creating a boom generation and 
certain  positive  economic  effects. 
Countries  wishing  to  acceler-
ate  fertility  declines  may  benefit 
from focusing on access to family-
planning  services  and  education 
about fertility decisions.
Education. Children are better able to contribute to eco-
nomic growth as they enter the workforce if they have received 
an effective education. East Asia capitalized on its baby boom 
by giving its children a high-quality education, including both 
general schooling and technical skills, that equipped them to 
meet the demands of an ever-changing labor market. Ireland 
also profited from its baby boomers by introducing free sec-
ondary schooling and expanding tertiary education.
Labor market institutions. Restrictive labor laws can limit 
a country’s ability to benefit from demographic change, par-
ticularly when they make it unduly difficult to hire and fire 
workers  or  to  work  part-time.  International  outsourcing, 
another controversial subject, may become an increasingly 
important means of meeting the demand for labor.
Trade. One way that East Asian countries provided their 
baby-boom  cohorts  with  productive  opportunities  was  by 
carefully  opening  up  to  international  trade.  By  providing 
a new avenue for selling the region’s output, this opening 
helped countries avoid the unemployment that could have 
arisen. We have found that open economies benefit much 
more from demographic change than the average, and that 
closed economies do not derive any statistically significant 
benefit from age structure changes.
Retirement. Population aging will require increased sav-
ings  to  finance  longer  retirements.  This  will  likely  affect 
financial markets, rates of return, and investment. In addi-
tion, as more people move into old age, health care costs will 
tend to increase, with the expansion of health care systems 
and growth in long-term care for the elderly. As nontradable, 
labor-intensive sectors with a low rate of technical progress, 
health care and elder care may slow economic growth. The 
ability of individuals to contribute to the financing of their 
retirement may be hampered by existing social security sys-
tems,  many  of  which  effectively  penalize  individuals  who 
work beyond a fixed retirement age.
* * * * *
Although demographic changes are generally easier to pre-
dict than economic changes, the big picture outlook is none-
theless unclear. Indeed, many forces that affect the world’s 
demographic profile are highly unpredictable. Will an out-
break of avian flu or another dis-
ease  become  pandemic,  killing 
many  millions  and  decimating 
economies? What happens if these 
diseases  are,  or  become,  drug-
resistant?  Conversely,  scientific 
advances in areas such as genom-
ics, contraceptive methods, or vac-
cines for diseases such as AIDS or 
malaria  could  save  and  improve 
millions  of  lives.  Global  warming 
and  other  environmental  change 
could completely alter the context 
of  demographic  and  economic 
predictions.  Or—to  take  things 
to  extremes—wars  could  result 
in  massive  premature  mortality, 
thereby rendering irrelevant most predictions about demo-
graphic and related economic changes.  n
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“The ability of countries to 
realize the potential benefits 
of the demographic transition 
and to mitigate the negative 
effects of aging depends 
crucially on the policy and 
institutional environment.”